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How should an investor unwind a portfolio in the face of recurring and uncertain liquidity needs? We
propose a model of portfolio liquidation in two periods to investigate this question, initially posed
by Myron Scholes following the fall of Long Term Capital Management. We show that when the expectation
of future liquidity needs is low, the optimal solution involves selling assets that have low permanent
and temporary price impacts of trading. However, when there is a high probability of a large future
liquidity need, the optimal solution involves retaining assets that have a small temporary impact of
trading. In the face of potential future adversity, there is a high option-value to the temporary component
of liquidity. The permanent component of liquidity does not share this feature, so that investors will
prefer to sell assets with a low ratio of permanent to temporary price impact in the early stages of a
crisis, and to hold on to assets with a high ratio of permanent to temporary price impact to protect
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Following the crisis that surrounded the downfall of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in
1998, Myron Scholes raised the following problem: how should an investment manager unwind a
portfolio when faced with present and possible future liquidity needs? Describing the situation where
“it is not possible to know the extent of the unfolding crisis,” he noted:
Most market participants respond by liquidating their most liquid investments ﬁrst to
reduce exposures and reduce leverage. ... However, after the liquidation, the remaining
portfolio is most likely unhedged and more illiquid. Without new inﬂows of liquidity,
the portfolio becomes even more costly to unwind and manage.
Scholes, 2000
This problem, which we call the Scholes liquidation problem, is prevalent during unstable ﬁnancial
periods. In the recent ﬁnancial crisis, banks incurred large losses during the forced contraction of
their balance sheets as access to short-term ﬁnancing through repo markets dried up (e.g., Adrian
and Shin, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009). A systemic deleveraging process propagated through the
banking sector, in which careful liquidation became crucial to preserving wealth and surviving the
crisis.
The key question of interest here is to determine which assets should be sold to meet short-term
obligations, keeping in mind the potential for liquidity needs in the future. This problem is distinct
from a related problem that has been extensively analyzed in the past. Previous work has focused
on the optimal way to liquidate a single asset, either as a monopolist (e.g., Bertsimas and Lo, 1998;
Huberman and Stanzl, 2005) or against selling pressure (e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005;
Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan, 2007).1 In these papers, a trader needs to sell a particular asset for
exogenous reasons. In the problem posed by Scholes, the trader needs to generate cash or reduce
leverage, and chooses which assets to sell. We will see that the optimal solution to this problem
has fundamentally diﬀerent economic implications.
We develop a two-period model where, in each period, the net cost of trading and the price
impact of trading on the market value of the assets is based on a continuous-time market. A single
investor holds a portfolio of assets, each with a market price that depends on how liquid it is. The
1See also Vayanos, 1998; Almgren and Chriss, 1999; Almgren, 2000; Fedyk, 2001; DeMarzo and Uroevic, 2004;
Oehmke, 2008; and Chu, Lehnert, and Passmore, 2009.
1price of each asset is impacted by trading depending on its permanent and temporary components
of liquidity (e.g., Sadka, 2005).2 The investor optimally trades the assets in the portfolio over a
ﬁnite amount of time to maximize the market value of the resulting positions. We focus exclusively
on the case of a risk-neutral investor.
We begin by analyzing a single-period problem in which the trader does not have to consider
future needs for liquidity. We ﬁrst characterize the optimal trading strategy of an investor who is
unencumbered by leverage constraints or liquidity needs. We show that the optimal strategy leads
the trader to accumulate assets that, all else being equal, have low ratio of temporary to permanent
price impact of trading.
We then consider two constrained-trading problems in which the investor either faces a limit on
leverage or experiences an urgent need for liquidity (i.e., need for cash). We call the latter scenario
myopic deleveraging because the investor is not required to consider any future implications of
holding a particular portfolio. These two scenarios both yield a simple but non-obvious result: the
optimal trading policy is, in general, not monotonic in either of an asset’s permanent and temporary
components of liquidity. The intuition is as follows. When the price impact of trading (either the
permanent or the temporary component) for an asset is high, the investor is required to sell more
of it to generate cash. However, when this is the case, the trader will also tend to sell other assets
more. How the investor should trade-oﬀ between these eﬀects will depend on the parameters of the
problem.
We further investigate the issue through comparative statics holding constant the shadow price
of the leverage or cash constraint. We ﬁnd that, for the same severity of the leverage or cash
constraint (as measured by its marginal cost), the amount of an asset that an investor sells during
distress is monotonically decreasing in both measures of illiquidity. That is, in the one-period
problem, the investor optimally sells assets that are more liquid to meet pending obligations.
This result changes, though, when we consider the two-period model for Scholes’ problem. In
period one, the investor is required to unwind part of the portfolio to reduce leverage. Subsequently,
with some probability, the investor may experience another liquidity shock and be required to
further unwind the portfolio in the second period. If no further distress occurs, trading ends.
However, if the investor suﬀers further distress, the problem faced in the second period is identical
2The permanent component of liquidity is the change in the asset’s price that that depends on the cumulative
amount traded, and is independent of the rate at which the asset is traded. The temporary component of liquidity
measures the instantaneous, reversible price pressure that results from trading. See Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan
(2007) for further discussion.
2to the single-period case. The probability of the future need for liquidity is known to the investor,
as is the size of the potential shock.
A central question of interest is what is the option value of holding liquid assets? A tradeoﬀ
arises in the ﬁrst period of the two-period problem. Selling the more liquid assets ﬁrst will limit
the immediate loss in value; however, the resulting portfolio will be more vulnerable to a continued
shock in future periods. Selling the less liquid assets ﬁrst will result in a portfolio that is more
robust to a continued adverse environment; however, this can result in possibly unnecessary loss in
value if there is no subsequent shock.
The solution in the two-period model is qualitatively diﬀerent from the myopic deleveraging
case in several ways. In the case of myopic deleveraging, the investor will only trade just enough
to meet the margin constraint; since trading is costly, there is no beneﬁt to trading any more than
necessary. This is not the case in the two-period model. When the expected second-period shock
is large enough, the investor will always want to trade away from the margin in the ﬁrst period. In
doing so, the investor retains cash to protect against a future shock.
Another, more surprising diﬀerence, is that the temporary component of liquidity is central to
risk-management behavior in the two-period model. If the expected need for liquidity is small,
the investor behaves in a similar way as in the one-period problem. However, when the expected
need for liquidity is large, the investor holds on to assets with a low temporary impact of trading
and sells relatively illiquid assets. This does not extend, however, to the permanent component of
liquidity. No matter how large the expectation for the second-period shock may be, the investor
always favors selling oﬀ more of assets with a low permanent price impact of trading in the ﬁrst
period.
This sheds light on the nature of the solution to the Scholes liquidation problem. Assets with
concentrated ownership or those with a high degree of asymmetric information (i.e., those with
high permanent price-impact) will not be prioritized for liquidation when an investor experiences
a recurrent need for liquidity. Assets that are heavily traded, where there are many opportunities
to access counterparties, may or may not be liquidated early. If the expected need for liquidity
is small, the investor optimally sells these securities to meet early obligations. However, if the
expected need for liquidity is large, the investor will hold onto these assets, preserving the option
to sell them in the future.
The analysis in this paper adds to a rather large literature on optimal liquidation, which has
focused on the case of a single asset. One exception is Duﬃe and Ziegler (2003), who numerically
investigate the trade-oﬀ between selling oﬀ an illiquid asset to keep a “cushion of liquid assets,”
3and selling a liquid asset to maximize short-term portfolio value. Illiquidity is modeled as linear
transaction costs, and permanent price impact of trading is not considered (they note, however,
that this may be a central concern for large investors). Our paper considers both temporary and
permanent price impact and, albeit with a considerably simpler model of uncertainty, provides an
analytical derivation of structural properties of the optimal solution. In this sense, and to our
knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to consider the problem of unwinding a portfolio where the choice of
assets to be sold is endogenous based on the liquidity characteristics of the assets in the portfolio.
The analysis in this paper also adds to the literature on window dressing (e.g., Carhart, Kaniel,
Musto, and Reed, 2002). Portfolio managers have been shown to trade assets at the end of repeating
periods to make their earnings or holdings look better to others. There is risk in doing this, since
there may be a need to unwind the new positions in subsequent periods. The model proposed in
this paper relates to this question as well, and some of our conclusions may be readily applied to
it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our one-period
trading model, and consider scenarios in which the investor is unconstrained, in which the investor
has a constraint on leverage, and in which the investor needs to generate cash through liquidation.
In Section 3, we explore the Scholes problem by solving a two-period portfolio management problem.
Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 One Period: Window-Dressing and Myopic Deleveraging
2.1 Price and Trading Model and Unconstrained Solution
Consider a single risk-neutral investor who trades a portfolio of n assets in continuous-time over a
ﬁnite horizon. At any time t ∈ [0,τ], Yt ∈ Rn is the rate at which the investor trades the assets.
The investor’s holdings are denoted by Xt ∈ Rn, where Xt = x0+
  t
0 Ysds. We will generally assume
x0 > 0. We assume that Yt is an L2-function.
The prices of the assets at time t are given by Pt ∈ Rn, which is determined by
Pt = q + ΓXt + ΛYt. (1)
This is a multi-dimensional version of the pricing equation used in Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan
(2007).3 The expression has three parts. The ﬁrst term q ∈ Rn speciﬁes the intercept of the linear
model, that is, the equilibrium prices that arise when the investor does not hold any assets and
3A similar pricing relationship for a single asset, where Γ and Λ are scalars, was previously derived by Gennotte
4is not trading.4 The second and third terms partition the price impact of trading into permanent
and temporary components. The permanent component measures the change in the price that
is independent of the rate at which any of the assets are traded. This impact is likely to be
high when the amount of asymmetric information associated with an asset is high or ownership of
the asset in the market is concentrated. The temporary component measures the instantaneous,
reversible price pressure that results from trading. This component is likely to be high when the
asset is thinly traded or there is a paucity of readily-available counterparties in the market. Both
Γ ∈ Rn×n and Λ ∈ Rn×n are matrices in which each diagonal entry is an asset’s own price impact
and each oﬀ-diagonal entry is the cross-price impact between two assets. We assume that Γ and Λ
are symmetric (Γ′ = Γ and Λ′ = Λ), non-negative (Γi,j ≥ 0 and Λi,j ≥ 0 for all i,j), and positive
deﬁnite (x′Γx > 0 and x′Λx > 0 for all x ∈ Rn such that x  = 0).
We denote the initial and ﬁnal positions by x0 = X0 and x1 = Xτ, and the cumulative trade by
y1 = x1 − x0. Prior to trading, the asset prices are p0 = P0− = q + Γx0. After trading is complete,
the price is
p1 = Pτ+ = q + Γx1 = q + Γ(x0 + y1) = p0 + Γy1.
Using the prime to denote the transpose operator, the end-of-period assets are
a1 = p′
1x1 = (p0 + Γy1)
′ (x0 + y1) = a0 + (p0 + Γx0)
′ y1 + y′
1Γy1,
a quadratic function of y1.
















We assume that cash is counted directly against liabilities for risk-management purposes or for the
satisfaction of margin constraints. Denoting the initial liabilities by l0, the liabilities at time τ can
then be written as l1 = l0 − κ1.
The optimal trading schedule is obtained from the following lemma.
and Kyle (1991), and Vayanos (1998). Empirical support for partitioning the price impact of trading into permanent
and temporary components is found in Kraus and Stoll (1972), Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1990), Cheng and
Madhavan (1997), and Sadka (2005). See Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007) for further discussion.
4We keep the within-period price path deterministic to be able to focus on the consequences of uncertainty about
future liquidity shocks, while keeping the problem analytically tractable. For small τ and when considering the
possibility of a large shock, we believe this to be a reasonable assumption. Further, as will be noted below, our model
is easily extended to consider a uniform relative price movement over all assets.
5Lemma 1. Consider an investor that wishes to maximize some function f(a1,l1), increasing in a1





y1, t ∈ [0,τ].
The intuition for Lemma 1 is that, for any given set of trades y1 and resulting ﬁnal prices p1
and assets a1, the concavity of the integrand in κ1 leads the trader to smooth trades over time to
minimize the transaction costs due to the temporary price impact of trading. Lemma 1 allows us
to simply focus on how much to liquidate each asset.
Since trading occurs at a constant rate for each asset, the end-of-period liabilities may be
computed as
l1 = l0 +
 















By simple accounting, e1, the investor’s equity at the end of trading, equals a1 − l1. We can use
this to express the equity as:

















ensuring that the trader’s problem is well-posed. Note that, without this restriction, the trader
may embark on trades of inﬁnite size and, in doing so, obtain arbitrarily large equity. This suggests
that it is a reasonable condition to ensure economic soundness of the model.
The following immediate result characterizes the solution to the trader’s unconstrained trading
problem, that is, when the trader faces no leverage constraints and may buy and sell assets as he
wishes.













in which case the optimal trade of asset i is increasing in the initial position in that asset x0,i in its
permanent price impact γi, and in the ratio γi/λi, and decreasing in its temporary price impact λi.
6If an investor were to repeatedly follow this policy without constraints on leverage, the size
of both assets and liabilities increases at a geometric rate. The composition of the portfolio is
impacted by the initial positions, and is concentrated on assets that are illiquid in terms of their











so that, if the investor is singularly concerned with maximizing equity and unlimited leverage
is allowed, the portfolio will become concentrated in assets with a high ratio of permanent to
temporary price impact. If all assets have the same ratio λi/γi, the portfolio weights remain
constant. This also holds for the non-diagonal case where Γi,j/Λi,j = r for all i and j, in which
case the optimal trades are proportional to the existing positions, y∗
1 = r
2−rx0.
For some brief additional insight into the eﬀect of cross-asset price impacts, consider a problem
with two assets. Deﬁne














The optimal trades are then y∗
1 = 1







 θ2γ1 − θcγc θ2γc − θcγ2
θ1γc − θcγ1 θ1γ2 − θcγc

x0.




































and the optimal trades are increasing in the permanent cross-asset price impact. This suggests
that cross-asset temporary price impact leads to a less aggressive build-up of leverage, while the
opposite is true for permanent cross-asset price impact. That is, while they change the optimal
solution, the cross-asset price impact terms have qualitatively similar eﬀects as the same-asset price
impact terms.
7Taking a large position concentrated in assets with a high ratio of permanent to temporary price
impact is essentially a strategy of cornering the market for actively-traded assets with small issues
and subject to asymmetric information. In general, however, this is not a good strategy for a large
player with liquidity constraints, especially in a multi-period setting. We consider these issues in
turn. In the next two subsections, we analyze the investor’s problem with liquidity constraints in
a one-period setting, and then study the two-period problem in Section 3.
2.2 Optimal Trades with Margin Constraint
Due to either margin requirements imposed by lenders or to regulatory or risk-management con-
straints there is, under normal circumstances, a limit on the ﬁnancial leverage that an investor can
incur. Diﬀerent ratios quantifying the degree to which an investor is leveraged can be found in the
literature. Three commonly-used ratios are liabilities over assets, assets over equity, and liabilities
over equity. All three ratios are increasing in the degree of ﬁnancial leverage, and are readily related
to each other by l/a =
l/e
l/e+1 and a/e = l/e+1. We specify limits on ﬁnancial leverage via a bound




This inequality can be written as a quadratic constraint on y1,
ρe0 − l0 + (ρΓx0 − p0)















y1 ≥ 0. (4)








l0, which states that, after accounting for transaction costs, the trades must generate enough cash
to cover all liabilities. If arbitrarily large leverage is permitted (ρ → +∞), the constraint becomes
the solvency constraint e1 ≥ 0.
The condition for the constraint on leverage to be convex and bounded is that Λ ≻
ρ−1
2(ρ+1)Γ.
(Note that if ρ ≤ 1 the constraint is convex for any Λ and Γ such that Λ ≻ 0 and Γ ≻ 0.) This
condition is implied by (3) and is therefore automatically ensured in our framework. It is a less
restrictive assumption than (3) so that the problem may be bounded for some objective functions
that are not concave.5
5Though maximization of a non-concave function over a convex set is in general an intractable problem, in such a
case we can actually still solve the problem and obtain a solution quite similar to that in Result 2 using a result from
convex analysis known as the S-lemma (see, e.g., P´ olik, Terlaky (2007)), a quadratic analog to the Farkas lemma. If
condition (3) is not satisﬁed, however, an unrestricted trader may still improve equity arbitrarily simply through the
act of trading.
8Result 2. Consider the optimal window-dressing problem where the investor chooses trades to
maximize equity subject to a constraint on leverage,
maximize e1
subject to l1 ≤ ρe1.




















((1 + zρ)Γx0 − zp0).
In the case where the price impact matrices Γ and Λ have diagonal structure, with diagonal entries

















The optimal trade of asset i, y∗
1,i, is increasing in ρ and decreasing in l0. The optimal trade of asset
i, y∗
1,i is not, in general, monotonic in λi, γi, or the ratio γi/λi.
The optimal trades for the diagonal case can alternatively be presented in the following form,
which makes the eﬀects of the price impact parameters and shadow price more clear:
y∗
1,i =
˜ γix0,i − ˜ z
(1 + ˜ z)2˜ λi − (1 − ˜ z)˜ γi
,
where ˜ z = z/(1 + zρ) ∈ [0,1/ρ] is monotonic in the shadow price, and ˜ γi = γi/pi and ˜ λi = λi/pi
are the relative price impacts.
According to Result 2, the investor trades more of an asset when the margin constraint is less
restrictive (higher ρ) and when the investor is more leveraged initially (higher l0). Trades are non-
monotonic in the price-impact parameters due to two opposing eﬀects, which can be appreciated
as follows. Consider an asset for which the price impact of trading increases, and how this changes
the optimal trades. On the one hand it will be comparatively more costly to deleverage, requiring
the investor to liquidate a larger share of the portfolio. On the other hand, the investor will prefer
to sell less of this particular asset, and more of others. Which eﬀect dominates as to the amount
that is liquidated of the asset in question is determined by how quickly the optimal trades shift
away from that asset, versus how quickly the fraction of the portfolio that needs to be liquidated
increases.
One can ﬁnd examples of problems where, over a reasonable range for the price impact pa-
rameters, y∗
1,i exhibits non-monotonic behavior. Figure 1 presents two examples where the optimal
9trades are not monotonic in the price impact parameters. In both cases there are two assets with
x0 = [1 1]′ and p0 = [1 1]′, and the investor is required to deleverage from a ratio of 19 (l0 = 1.9,
e0 = 0.1) to meet ρ = 10. In the ﬁrst example, γ1 = γ2 = 0, λ2 = 0.05, and λ1 ranges from 0.001
to 0.05. In the second example, λ1 = λ2 = γ2 = 0.026, and γ1 ranges from 0 to 0.05.


































Figure 1: Examples where the optimal trades are not monotonic in the price impact parameters.
In this paper, we only consider constraints on leverage and, as we will see next, constraints on the
size the trade in each asset in the diagonal case. In practice, an investor may want to incorporate
other constraints into the problem. From the point of view of computational tractability, any
modiﬁcation that preserves the convexity of the problem can be easily handled. This includes
constraints on position size or on trade size, or any number of risk constraints in a mean-variance
framework (see, e.g., Lobo, Fazel and Boyd (2007)). However, in most cases we lose the ability to
provide an analytical description of the optimal policy, or to provide structural insights into it. We
present next an important exception to this, with a formulation that captures the major features
of the problem of deleveraging under distress, and for which we can provide substantial insight into
the solution.
2.3 Forced Deleveraging in the Diagonal Case
We are especially interested in modeling liquidity shocks which force an investor to quickly sell
assets to reduce leverage. These shocks may arise from a number of reasons, such as a decrease
in the value of assets, unexpectedly large investor withdrawals, or margin calls due to a transition
to a more risk-averse environment (which in our model translates to requiring a lower ρ). When
doing a ﬁre sale to mitigate risk, the investor is not allowed to increase positions nor to short-sell,
which corresponds to the box constraints
−x0,i ≤ y1,i ≤ 0.
10We remind the reader that, in everything that follows, we will be considering sales of assets, which
correspond to negative values in the trades vector. Thus, y1,i < y1,j should be interpreted as
meaning we liquidate more of asset i than asset j.
A recurring assumption in our analysis of the diagonal case in both the single-period and two
period models is the assumption that, for all i, ργix0,i ≤ p0,i. If this condition is violated for a
particular asset i, selling any amount of it hurts both net equity and the leverage ratio. Such an
asset can therefore be excluded from the problem without loss of generality.
The case of diagonal structure with box constraints can be analyzed as follows.
Result 3. Consider the single-period deleveraging problem
maximize e1
subject to l1 ≤ ρe1
−x0 ≤ y1 ≤ 0,
where Γ and Λ have diagonal structure, with diagonal entries γi and λi, and deleveraging is required
( l0
e0 > ρ). The optimal solution satisﬁes l1
























The optimal trade of asset i, y∗
1,i, is increasing in ρ and decreasing in l0, but is not, in general,
monotonic in x0,i, in λi, nor in γi.







˜ γix0,i − ˜ z
(1 + ˜ z)2˜ λi − (1 − ˜ z)˜ γi
  
,
for some ˜ z ∈ [0,1/ρ], where ˜ γi = γi/pi and ˜ λi = λi/pi.
Not surprisingly, the trader will sell-oﬀ so that the margin constraint binds. This maximizes
value in the single period case but, as we will see in the next section, may not hold in the multi-
period setting. Consistent with the ﬁndings in Section 2.2, trading in any asset i is not, in general,
monotonic in its price impact parameters.
To gain more insight into the relationship between asset sales during distress and the price
impact parameters, we can analyze the problem given a constant shadow price. That is, we can
consider portfolio modiﬁcations such that the marginal penalty in equity for increasing the margin
11requirement is constant. This allows us to isolate the eﬀect of shifting sales from one asset to
another from the price impact on the marginal cost of partial liquidation of the portfolio.
The next result characterizes some important relationships, and will allow us to illuminate the
fundamental changes in the structure of the optimal trades in the two-period case.
Result 4. For the single-period problem with diagonal structure, consider directional derivatives
of the problem parameters (p0,γ,λ,x0,l0,ρ) such that the shadow price z is constant. That is,
consider modiﬁcations of the portfolio such that the marginal penalty in equity for increasing the
margin requirement is constant. Along such directions, y∗
1,i is increasing in γi, in λi, and in x0,i.
From this we derive the two following corollary results:
i) Assets with low price impact are prioritized for liquidation. If two assets i and j are such
that p0,i = p0,j, γi ≤ γj, λi ≤ λj and x0,i = x0,j, then y∗
1,i ≤ y∗
1,j.
ii) Assets with smaller holdings are prioritized for liquidation. If two assets i and j are such that
p0,i = p0,j, γi = γj, λi = λj, and x0,i < x0,j, then y∗
1,i ≤ y∗
1,j (unless asset i is fully liquidated,
such that y∗
1,i = −x0,i > y∗
1,j).
Result 4 allows us to establish an ordering for myopic distressed sales. Over assets that are
otherwise identical and of which the investor has similar holdings, the more liquid assets are sold
ﬁrst. Likewise, over assets that are equally liquid, assets of which the investor has smaller holdings
are sold ﬁrst. Note that, while the proofs of the monotonicity with respect to λi and x0,i are trivial
from the partial derivatives of y∗
1,i and hold without the distressed-deleveraging box constraints, this
is not the case for γi (for which the monotonicity does not hold without the no-shorting constraint).
The monotonicities in the price impact parameters imply that in distressed sales due to short-
lived shocks, traders should deleverage as described by Scholes. Speciﬁcally, traders sell-oﬀ their
most liquid holdings to generate cash or decrease their liabilities. The problem changes, however,
when a future further need for liquidity may arise. In some cases, it may still be optimal to prioritize
the selling-oﬀ of more liquid securities. However, we will see that in other cases risk management
may lead to diﬀerent optimal strategies. To investigate this, we turn to a two-period setting next.
123 Two Periods: Optimal Deleveraging with Recurring Shock
3.1 Model and Preemptive Deleveraging
Consider now a single investor who trades in n assets over two periods. Each period is a discrete
amount of time [0,τ], in which trading occurs continuously as before. Prices arise from the process





Since we wish to study policies regarding deleveraging under distress, we restrict the investor’s
trades to be reductions in positions and disallow shorting.
The key diﬀerence now is that there is uncertainty during period one about whether the investor
will face the need for further liquidity during period two. This uncertainty may arise because of
unforseen equity withdrawals, higher cash requirement to fund other areas of the business, less
favorable funding conditions (e.g., tighter margin constraints), or a uniform (i.e., systematic) drop
in asset prices. The uncertainty is resolved between the periods. We model the shock as an early
equity withdrawal, which generalizes to all the situations mentioned. Speciﬁcally, the amount





δ, with probability π
0, with probability 1 − π.
(5)
If there is a second-period shock, liabilities increase by δ, resulting in a more leveraged balance
sheet. If this is the case, the investor is required to liquidate assets in the second trading period to
deleverage to within allowed limits.
Following the notation of the previous section, the equilibrium price after the second period is
p2 = q + Γx2
= p0 + Γ(y1 + y2),
and the assets at the end of the second period are
a2 = p′
2x2
= (p0 + Γ(y1 + y2))
′ (x0 + y1 + y2)
= a0 +

























13Using the same price model as for the single-period problem, the investor trades y2 for an average
price of p1 + Λy2 + 1
2Γy2. After withdrawals ∆, the investor is then left with liabilities
l2 = l1 + ∆ +
 




































and the second-period equity, e2 = a2 − l2, is


































can be written as a quadratic constraint on the vector of ﬁrst- and second-period trades,
ρe0 − l0 − (1 + ρ)∆ +

















 ρ(Λ − 1




2(1 − ρ)Γ ρ(Λ − 1










Now, we proceed to characterize optimal trading in this multi-period setting. The ﬁrst impor-




binds in the ﬁrst period. That is, we consider whether the investor deleverages preemptively
(i.e., more than is immediately required) in the ﬁrst period when there is a potential need for
liquidity in the future. The following result addresses this question.
Result 5. Suppose that the investor’s initial holdings are such that l0/e0 > ρ and that the trade
y1 = −x0/2 strictly satisﬁes the ﬁrst-period margin constraint. Further, assume that
((1 + ρ)Λ + Γ)x0 ≤ p0. (7)
Then, there exists a threshold shock level ˆ δ ≥ 0 such that the optimal two-period solution satisﬁes
l1/e1 = ρ for all δ ∈ [0, ˆ δ] and ll/el < ρ for all feasible δ > ˆ δ.
14Result 5 says that, under mild conditions, the optimal two-period liquidator may in fact delever-
age beyond what is required in the ﬁrst period. When the potential need for future liquidity is
large, the margin constraint does not bind in the ﬁrst period. This result arises even though the
investor is risk neutral. Due to the convexity of the penalty incurred in a large ﬁre sale, the investor
manages future liquidity risk by over-liquidating the portfolio early on.
Result 5 also implies that if the future need for liquidity is high enough, the investor substitutes
liquid assets for illiquid ones. If we interpret cash to be the (n + 1)th asset in the portfolio, the
investor overweighs this liquid asset to the detriment of other securities when the future need for
liquidity is suﬃciently large.
The conditions in Result 5 are mild and can be appreciated as follows. First, there is a bound on
the ﬁrst period shock so that a liquidation of exactly one-half the portfolio is suﬃcient to generate
enough cash to meet the ﬁrst-period margin constraint. Given that such a trade is very extreme,
this assumption is rather weak. The condition in (7) is simply an upper bound on the temporary
impact costs associated with a complete liquidation of the portfolio. If the temporary impact costs
associated with trading are so high that this condition is violated, then these transaction costs
dominate and risk mitigation behavior as demonstrated in the above result may not occur.
For the remainder of this section, we impose the requirement that the ﬁrst-period trades be
such that the second-period constraint on leverage can be met under any realization of ∆. The
two-period problem of the expected-equity maximizing investor is then
maximize E∆ e2
subject to l1 ≤ ρe1, l2 ≤ ρe2,∀∆
−x0 ≤ y1 ≤ 0, − x1 ≤ y2 ≤ 0,∀∆,
where the optimization is over y1 and y2, where y1 is in Rn and y2 is {0,δ}  → Rn (or, equivalently,
a random variable in Rn measurable in the sigma-algebra generated by ∆).
Note that, with this problem speciﬁcation, the restrictions on trades that prevent the investor
from increasing positions and from short-selling in the second period are assumed to hold even if
there is no second-period shock. This restriction seems appropriate since, around a crisis event for
the investor, or around a period of heightened market uncertainty, more strict risk management
prevents the investor from hastily increasing risk exposure. (A multi-period extension of this model
might naturally lead to a constraint of this nature.)6
6If we relax this constraint, the problem is less tractable. The expressions become far more complicated due to
the necessity of including the solution to a myopic single-period problem in the second-period objective, weighted by
15This constraint simpliﬁes the problem because, when ∆ = 0, the optimal second-period trade
is then y2 = 0. This is shown by computing the gradient of the objective with respect to y2 at
y2 = 0, which is Γx1. Under assumptions of no shorting and γi,j ≥ 0, all entries of the gradient are
non-negative. This, together with the concavity of the objective in y2 (guaranteed by Λ ≻ 1
2Γ) and
the convexity of the box constraints, ensures that, if the constraint on leverage is not binding, the
optimum is achieved at y2 = 0. The ﬁrst-period leverage constraint and ﬁrst-period trades in turn
ensure that, absent a second-period shock, the second-period leverage constraint is not binding.
With a slight abuse of notation, we now use y2 ∈ Rn to denote the second period trades
associated with the realization ∆ = δ. Likewise, we refer to l2 and e2 as the liabilities and equity
when ∆ = δ. Noting that when ∆ = 0, the optimal second-period equity is e2 = e1, we can now
write the investor’s expected-equity-maximization problem as
maximize (1 − π)e1 + πe2
subject to l1 ≤ ρe1, l2 ≤ ρe2
−x0 ≤ y1 ≤ 0, − x1 ≤ y2 ≤ 0.
(8)
The program variables are y1 ∈ Rn and y2 ∈ Rn, and the objective is a quadratic functional in R2n,
E∆ e2 = (1 − π)e1 + πe2






























To assure that the problem is well-posed, we assume that E∆e2 is strictly concave jointly in y1
and y2, and that the second-period constraint on leverage is strictly convex jointly in y1 and y2.












which is not much more restrictive that the condition for the single-period case.7
the probability 1 − π. However, the analysis is identical if we restrict δ to be such that the margin constraint binds
in the ﬁrst period (i.e., δ ≤ ˆ δ). Further, additional analysis indicates that solutions to this modiﬁed problem are
qualitatively similar, in that results regarding both preemptive deleveraging and change in preferred order in which
assets are liquidated apply for large-enough second-period shocks.
7Note, however, that the two-period problem is guaranteed to be bounded using only the weaker assumption that
we introduced for the single-period problem, Λ ≻
ρ−1
2(ρ+1)Γ. This assumption ensures strict convexity of the ﬁrst-period
leverage constraint, and therefore boundedness of y1. With y1 bounded by the ﬁrst-period constraint on leverage,
we only need convexity in y2 of the second-period constraint on leverage to ensure boundedness of y2, which is also
ensured by Λ ≻
ρ−1
2(ρ+1)Γ. This assumption is therefore suﬃcient to ensure that the optimal trades are ﬁnite. The
same caveats as in the single-period case apply for this weaker constraint.
16Characterizing the solution to problem (8) for the diagonal case is the subject of the next
subsection.
3.2 Diagonal Case and Monotonicity
Consider the two-period problem with the two leverage constraints dualized,
maximize (1 − π)e1 + πe2 + z1 (ρe1 − l1) + z2 (ρe2 − l2)
subject to −x0 ≤ y1 ≤ 0, − x1 ≤ y2 ≤ 0.
(10)
If Λ and Γ have diagonal structure and we ﬁx the values of z1 and z2, the problem can be decoupled
in the assets in that the optimal solution can be obtained by the independent maximization of
(y1,i,y2,i) for each asset i. We can then independently derive the solution for each asset i as a
function of the ﬁrst- and second-period shadow prices. The objective can be written as a sum of
terms associated with each asset,














. The constant term c and the linear and quadratic terms bi and Ai depend on
the ﬁrst- and second-period shadow prices z1 and z2, and are as follows,
c = e0 − πδ + (ρe0 − l0)(z1 + z2) − (1 + ρ)δz2
bi =

 ργix0,i + (ργix0,i − p0,i)(z1 + z2)





 ρ(λi − 1
2γi) + ((ρ + 1)λi − 1
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The constraints disallowing position increases and short sales can be equivalently stated as
y1,i ≤ 0, y2,i ≤ 0, and y1,i + y2,i ≥ −x0,i.
This deﬁnes a triangular feasible set for the ﬁrst- and second-period trades in each asset. We graph
these cases in Figure 2 and derive their optimal trades in Table 3.2. Depending on which constraints




































Table 1: Enumeration of cases for the linear constraints on each asset.
18the amount of deleveraging required immediately, the size and likelihood of a potential shock in
the second period, and the liquidity parameters and holdings of a particular asset.
The ﬁrst two cases are the most interesting, as the remaining ﬁve correspond to more extreme
situations. In Case 1, the optimal solution is strictly in the interior of the triangle. If an asset is in
this region, it has favorable enough liquidity properties that is optimal to sell some of it in the ﬁrst
period, and some of it in the second period if a subsequent need for liquidity arises. However, even
if a shock does occur in the second period, the investor will not fully liquidate the asset. Case 2 is
similar to Case 1, except that if the shock occurs, the investor is forced to liquidate the entire stake
in the asset. The investor would prefer to sell more of the asset, but the no-short-sales constraint
binds and changes the character of the optimal solution.
In Case 3, the investor chooses to liquidate some of the asset in period one but nothing further
in period two if a shock occurs. This may occur, for instance, if a large amount of deleveraging
is required immediately but the subsequent size of ∆ is small. Case 5 is similar except that the
investor liquidates all of the asset immediately. This may occur if the ﬁrst-period deleveraging is
large and the asset is very liquid.
In Case 4, the investor does not sell the asset in the ﬁrst period, but does sell some of it in
the second period. This might occur if the asset is relatively illiquid but, due to limitations on
positions of the other assets, the investor has no choice but to sell some of it if a second-period
shock occurs. Case 6 is similar to Case 4 in that the asset is not sold in the ﬁrst period, but is
completely liquidated in the second period. This might occur if ∆ is very large. Finally, in case 7,
the investor does not liquidate any of the asset. This might happen if the asset is highly illiquid or
if ∆ is very small.
In practice, the solution to the investor’s trading problem can be computed by several ap-
proaches. One alternative is as follows. First, for some given shadow prices (z1,z2) and for each
asset i, compute all seven cases of (y1,i,y2,i) and the associated value of the objective. From these,
exclude the cases that violate the conditions y1,i ≤ 0, y2,i ≤ 0, and y1,i+y1,i ≥ −x0,i, and select the
valid case with the highest objective value. Then, with the optimal (y1,y2) for the dualized prob-
lem, compute the value of the investor’s objective function that is associated with that particular
(z1,z2) and the slack in the leverage constraints. Then, update (z1,z2) and repeat the procedure
to converge to the optimal value that satisﬁes both leverage constraints. A wide array of updating
rules for (z1,z2) that will ensure convergence to the optimum are available in the mathematical
programming literature. Given that this is a two-dimensional problem, any simple rule will be
eﬀective.















Figure 3: Optimal ﬁrst-period trade as a function of λi.
We now characterize the solution to the investor’s two-period problem. Before formally pre-
senting our results regarding monotonicity of the optimal trades in the price impact parameters,
it is instructive to consider the following motivating example. For some asset i, we have x0,i = 1,
p0,i = 1, and γi = 0.01. The probability of a second-period shock is π = 0.2, and the allowed
leverage ratio is ρ = 10. The other assets in the investor’s portfolio, the initial liabilities l0, and
the shock magnitude δ are assumed to be such that the shadow prices are z1 = 0.04 and z2 = 0.2.
Figure 3 plots the optimal ﬁrst-period trade as a function of λi. If λi is small (less than approxi-
mately 0.03), the asset will be fully liquidated in the case of a second-period shock. In this range,
for a more liquid asset a larger proportion is held over for the second period (as we will see, this
is the consequence of a high second-period shadow price, which arises from the expectation of a
severe second-period shock). On the other hand, if λi is large (more than approximately 0.03), the
asset is not fully liquidated, even in the event that a second-period shock occurs. In this range,
comparatively less is sold in both periods when the asset is less liquid, as this particular asset
becomes costly to dispose of quickly. The kink in y∗
1,i(λi) comes from the transition from case 2
to case 1 (the constraint y1,i + y2,i ≥ −x0,i switches from binding to non-binding). We will more
formally explore the structure of the two-period problem, but this motivating example illustrates
an important feature of the solution. The monotonicities that held for the one-period problem (Re-
sult 4) do not always hold for the two-period problem and there are situations where the investor
20optimally sells comparatively more of a less liquid asset than of a more liquid asset.
Result 6. Let i and j be any two assets with equal initial prices and equal initial holdings such
that λi < λj, γi < γj, and γi/λi < γj/λj. Then, for any δ such that the problem is strictly feasible
and any π ∈ [0,1), y∗
1,i < y∗
1,j.
According to Result 6, if an asset is a) more liquid than another asset in terms of its temporary
and permanent price impacts, and b) has a lower ratio of permanent to temporary price impact,
then the investor optimally sells more of the liquid asset in the ﬁrst period, no matter how extreme
the expected second-period shock. The second condition implies that the investor prefers to sell
assets that have a relatively low permanent impact of trading compared to the transaction costs of
trading (i.e., the temporary component).
So far, this result is consistent with the optimal trading behavior derived in Section 2.3. The
next result, however, explores what happens when one asset is more liquid than another, but the
ratio points in the opposite direction.
Result 7. Consider the two-period liquidation problem, and assume that the trade y1 = −1
2x0
strictly satisﬁes the ﬁrst-period margin constraint and that ((1 + ρ)λk + γk)x0,k ≤ p0,k for all k.
Let i and j be two assets with equal initial prices and equal initial holdings such that γi/λi < γj/λj.
Then, for any ρ > 0, π ∈ [0,1), there exists a δ such that y∗
1,i < y∗
1,j.
According to Result 7, for a large enough expected second-period shock, the ratio of permanent
to temporary price is more important than the price impacts considered individually. In this case,
the investor may favor selling less liquid assets in the ﬁrst period to hedge against the future need
for liquidity. Selling assets with a low ratio of permanent to temporary price impact is optimal,
and may result in keeping more liquid securities on hand for the eventuality of a second shock.
Result 7 has a non-obvious implication. If the expected second-period shock is suﬃciently large,
the investor may wish to retain more of a liquid asset j that has both lower temporary and lower







from which we see that if the option value of keeping the liquid asset is suﬃciently high due to
its temporary component, then the investor will prefer to retain the liquid asset and incur the
short-term penalty from selling an asset with a higher permanent price impact. This suggests that
the temporary price impact is the main determinant of policies to manage the risk that a shock
may worsen.
21Our ﬁnal result follows directly from the previous two results. It directly addresses the problem
posed by Scholes, and presents a striking departure from the results in the one-period problem.
Result 8. Consider a two-period liquidation problem where m assets have equal holdings and equal
initial prices (which we denote by i = 1,...,m, m ≤ n). Then the following hold:
(a) If λ1 = λ2 =     = λm and γ1 < γ2 <     < γm, then for any δ for which the problem is
strictly feasible, we have y∗
1,1 < y∗
1,2 <     < y∗
1,m.
(b) If γ1 = γ2 =     = γm and λ1 > λ2 >     > λm and, further, ((1 + ρ)λk + γk)x0,k ≤ p0,k for
all k and y1 = −1
2x0 strictly satisﬁes the ﬁrst-period margin constraint, then for any ρ > 0,
π ∈ [0,1) there exists a δ such that y∗
1,1 < y∗
1,2 <     < y∗
1,m.
The ﬁrst statement says that the investor will always want to trade assets that have a low per-
manent price impact, no matter how great the expected need for future liquidity may be. However,
the second statement says that this does not hold for the temporary component of liquidity: if the
future shock is suﬃciently large, then the investor optimally holds on to assets that have a small
temporary component of liquidity in the ﬁrst period in preparation for the possibility of future
distress.
This ﬁnding has important consequences and empirical import. Speciﬁcally, when we decouple
the two determinants of liquidity, it is the size of the expected shock and the temporary component
that seem most important in determining which assets are liquidated. Diﬀerentials in the perma-
nent impact of trading do not change the qualitative solution to the Scholes liquidation problem.
This implies that securities that diﬀer in the amount of asymmetric information, or diﬀer in how
concentrated their ownership is, will be liquidated in amounts that preserve their relative order.
However, the transaction costs that arise due to limited immediate access to counterparties or to
a high-volume market, may aﬀect the order in which assets are liquidated in a multi-period frame-
work. In this sense, our analysis indicates that the magnitude of δ and the matrix Λ drive the
qualitative nature of the solution to the Scholes liquidation problem.
4 Conclusion
The question raised by Scholes is central to investors in ﬁnancial markets during crises, when the
option value of holding liquid assets is poorly understood. We have developed a model of distressed
liquidation in two periods that has allowed us to begin investigating this question.
22We ﬁnd that when the expected future need for liquidity is high, the option value of liquidity
is larger, leading to a shift in preferences towards holding more liquid assets. In a multi-period
setting where investors need to consider recurring liquidity shocks, the temporary and permanent
components of liquidity do not eﬀect the solution equally. The temporary price impact only has
an immediate eﬀect on the investor’s objective. On the other hand, the permanent price impact
not only has an immediate eﬀect, it also changes the ‘state’ of the system so that its eﬀect extends
into the future. Its eﬀect is magniﬁed relative to the eﬀect of the temporary price impact and,
no matter how high the option value of holding liquid assets, the liquidation order never reverses
simply due to the permanent price impact.
On a more fundamental level there is, in the ﬁrst period, a trade-oﬀ between the immediate value
from liquidation and the option value of holding an asset since, in periods of crisis or instability,
an investor cannot quickly rebuild liquidated positions. As Scholes noted, “since it is not possible
to know the extent of the unfolding crisis, holding and not selling the less liquid instruments is
similar to buying an option to hold a position.” Our analysis indicates that the precise form that
this trade-oﬀ in value takes, that is how immediate value and option value are balanced, is tied in
a fundamental way to the ratio between an asset’s permanent and temporary price impacts.
23A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. For any given trading target y1, the ﬁnal assets a1 does not depend on the execution schedule.
A constant trading rate will then maximize κ1 and minimize the liabilities, a straightforward result
in calculus of variations for which we refer the reader to Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007),
Bertsimas and Lo (1998) or Huberman and Stanzl (2005).
Proof of Result 1.





y1 = 0 which, for
Γ and Λ − 1
2Γ positive deﬁnite, has a single solution as stated. From concavity in y1 of e1 and
continuity of its gradient, the ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient. The monotonicities
for the diagonal case follow from diﬀerentiation and from the positivity assumptions on x0, Γ and
Λ (Γ ≻ 0 and Λ ≻ 0 imply γi > 0 and λi > 0 for all i).
Proof of Result 2.
Proof. The condition Λ ≻ 1
2Γ that ensures concavity of e1 also implies convexity of the constraint


















































1 = ((1 + zρ)Γx0 − zp0),
and the condition on Γ and Λ, combined with z > 0, ensure that these equations are uniquely
invertible. The alternative expression for y∗
1,i in the diagonal case presented immediately after
the result follows from algebraic manipulation, with ˜ z = z/(1 + zρ). Increasing ρ (or decreasing
l0) relaxes the margin constraint, which implies a smaller shadow price z. The optimal trade is
monotonic in decreasing in ˜ z, which is increasing in z. The non-monotonicity in λi and γi follows
from any counter-example (see below).
Proof of Result 3.
24Proof. Consider the problem with the leverage constraint dualized,
maximize e1 + z(l1 − ρe1)
subject to −x0 ≤ y1 ≤ 0,
With diagonal structure the assets are decoupled, in that the solution can be obtained by
separately optimizing the trades in each asset. If the box constraint in asset i is not active,
its solution is as stated in Result 2. The monotonicities follow by the same arguments as in
Result 2.
Proof of Result 4.
Proof. The proofs for λi and x0,i are immediate from the partial derivative of y∗
1,i. Consider now γi.
Since the proof only looks at asset i (the constancy of z ensures that the assets remain decoupled),




∂γi can then be seen to simplify to
2λi + (2λi − 1)z + z2.





1 − 2λi −
 
4λ2
i − 12λi + 1
 
,
if λi ≤ 3/2 −
√
2, and for all z otherwise. From the constraint on short sales y∗
1,i ≥ −1, the dual
variable z must satisfy
z ≤
2λi





The proof is completed by showing that this is less than z0 for any λi > 0. The inequality can be
written as
8λ2
i − 10λi + 1 > (1 − 4λi)
 
4λ2
i − 12λi + 1.
From inspection of the roots of the diﬀerent factors, both sides are positive for λi ≤ 3/2−
√
2, and
we can therefore square both sides. Collecting terms, the inequality then simpliﬁes to 64λ3
i > 0.
The corollaries are then immediate. Note that they can also be proved directly by a swapping
argument: if the monotonicity is violated, the investor can do better equity-wise by swapping y∗
1,i
and y∗
1,j while will still satisfying the problem constraints, thereby contradicting the optimality of
y∗
1. The second part of the corollary follows directly from the expression for y∗
1,i.
Proof of Result 5.
25Proof. Notice that for δ = 0, the two-period problem is identical to the myopic deleveraging
problem. Thus, at δ = 0 it must be the case for the optimal solution to satisfy l1/el = ρ. Suppose
not, i.e., suppose at δ = 0, we have l1/e1 < ρ. Then the shadow price of the ﬁrst-period margin
constraint is zero, and the problem is equivalent to a problem that maximizes the net equity subject
to −x0 ≤ y1 ≤ 0. Since we have y1 ≤ 0, Γ ≥ 0 and x0 ≥ 0, it follows that


















with equality strict for any nonzero y1 due to Λ − Γ/2 ≻ 0. This means y1 = 0 must be optimal,
which is a contradiction, as the trader initially satisﬁed l0/e0 > ρ.
Now consider the maximum possible δ such that the two-period problem is still feasible. We
will consider the problem of ﬁnding the maximum such δ and show that at this value, it must be
that ll/el < ρ. Denote this maximum feasible δ by ¯ δ; one can see that ¯ δ is given by
¯ δ =
ρa0 − (ρ + 1)l0 + ρv⋆
ρ + 1
,
where v⋆ is the optimal value of the (convex) problem





































−x0 ≤ y1 ≤ 0
−x0 − y1 ≤ y2 ≤ 0.
We will show that the optimal solution will strictly satisfy the ﬁrst-period margin constraint, so we
will omit this constraint for now as we consider computation of ¯ δ. Deﬁne the following for ease of
notation:

























Since d ≥ 0 (by assumption; recall that for any asset i for which di ≤ 0, we can remove it from the
original problem without loss of generality) and D ≻ 0 (strict convexity), it can never be optimal
to have y1 > 0 or y2 > 0 above, and therefore we can ignore the non-positivity constraints.
26We thus focus on ﬁnding the optimal value to the problem








subject to y1 + y2 + x0 ≥ 0.
Using Lagrange multipliers ν ≥ 0 for the inequality constraints, the Lagrangian to this problem is
given by
L(y1,y2,ν) = x′






















If we can ﬁnd a ν ≥ 0 such that the corresponding solution is also feasible, then it must be optimal.
Let H = A + B and ν = d − Hx0. We have
ν = d − (A + B)x0
= p0 − ρΓx0 − ((ρ + 1)Λ + (1 − ρ)Γ)x0
≥ p0 − ρΓx0 − (p0 − Γx0 + (1 − ρ)Γx0)
= 0,
where in the inequality we are using the condition that the temporary impact component be suﬃ-































Clearly, splitting up the trade in half over the two periods satisﬁes the no-short sales constraints.
Moreover, by assumption, it strictly satisﬁes the ﬁrst-period margin constraint. Thus, this solution
27is feasible and therefore optimal to the above problem for ﬁnding v⋆, and hence the maximum level
¯ δ.
Notice that strict convexity of the objective implies that this is the only optimal solution to this
problem; hence, at δ = ¯ δ, the trade (y1,y2) = (−x0/2,−x0/2) is the only feasible solution; since it
satisﬁes the ﬁrst-period margin constraint strictly, we have found a large enough δ such that the
optimal solution to the two-period problem satisﬁes l1/el < ρ.
Thus, at δ = 0 we have l1/e1 = ρ and at δ = ¯ δ we have l1/e1 < ρ; the shadow price z1 associated
with the ﬁrst-period margin constraint is a continuous and nonincreasing function of δ. This implies
that at some δ ∈ (0, ¯ δ), the shadow price goes to zero, proving the threshold property that was
claimed.
Proof of Condition (9).
Proof. Consider two matrices A and B in Rn×n such that A = A′, B = B′, A ≻ 0, and B ≻ 0. We







is positive deﬁnite if and only if A ≻ B. Since A ≻ 0, M is positive deﬁnite if and only if its
Schur complement is positive deﬁnite: A − BA−1B ≻ 0. Since A ≻ 0, by change of coordinates
this is equivalent to I −
 
A−1/2BA−1/2 2
≻ 0. Since A−1/2BA−1/2 is symmetrical and therefore
has identical left and right eigenvectors, the condition is true if and only if all the eigenvalues of
A−1/2BA−1/2 satisfy λ2 < 1. Since A−1/2BA−1/2 is positive deﬁnite, this is equivalent to λ < 1.
We conclude that we can write the condition on the Schur complement as I − A−1/2BA−1/2 ≻ 0.
By change of coordinates, this is equivalent to A − B ≻ 0.





By change of coordinates, the matrix in the quadratic form in E∆e2 is positive deﬁnite if
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28Proof of Result 6.
Proof. We prove the result for the interesting Cases in Table 3.2 (Cases 1 and 2); the proof for
Cases 3 to 7 follows in similar fashion.
We will show that y⋆
1,i < y⋆
1,j holds for any such δ and π in the three situations below, which
cover all possibilities at the optimal solution:
1. The no-short sales constraints are not binding for either asset i or asset j (i.e., both are in
case 1).
2. The no-short sales constraint is binding for asset i but not asset j (asset i is in case 2 and
asset j is in case 1; we will argue the intuitive fact that the reverse situation cannot occur).
3. The no-short sales constraints are binding for both assets i and j (both assets are in case 2).
Situation 1: Assume that at the optimal solution, the no-short sales constraints are not binding for
either asset i or asset j, and assume that y⋆
1,i ≥ y⋆
1,j. We will show that such a solution cannot be
optimal. To this end, we will show there exists a feasible direction from (y⋆
1,y⋆
2) in which we can
head and strictly improve the objective. This implies that the solution cannot be optimal.
In particular, for some ǫ > 0, let ǫ1 be the vector with zeros everywhere but −ǫ in entry i and
+ǫ in entry j. Notice that, for a suﬃciently small ǫ, the solution (y⋆
1 + ǫ1,y⋆
2) still satisﬁes the
no-short sales constraints.
Now we examine the gradients of the liability amount and the net equity in each period. For
the ﬁrst period, we have
∇l1(y1) = p0 + (2Λ + Γ)y1
∇e1(y1) = Γx0 − (2Λ − Γ)y1,
and thus, since we have 0 ≥ y⋆
1,i ≥ y⋆
1,j, λi < λj, and γi < γj:
ǫ′
1∇l1(y⋆
1)/ǫ = −(2λi + γi)y⋆
1,i + (2λj + γj)y⋆
1,j ≤ 0,
and (recalling that convexity requires 2λi − γi ≥ 0 for all i):
ǫ′
1∇e1(y⋆
1)/ǫ = (γj − γi)x0 − (2λj − γj)y⋆
1,j + (2λi − γi)y⋆
1,i






(γj − γi)x0 if 2(λj − λi) − (γj − γi) ≥ 0
2(λj − λi)x0 otherwise,
> 0.
29We also note that
∇l2(y1,y2) =

p0 + (2Λ + Γ)y1 + Γy2





Γx0 − (2Λ − Γ)y1 + Γy2
Γx0 + Γy1 − (2Λ − Γ)y2















2) ≤ 0 and ǫ′
1Γ(x0+y⋆
1+y⋆
2) ≥ 0, then [ǫ′
1 0]∇l2(y⋆
1,y⋆








2) ≤ 0 but ǫ′
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1 + y⋆











2) ≤ 0 and ǫ′
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= 2((γj − γi)x0 − (2λj − γj)(y⋆
1,j + y⋆
2,j) + (2λi − γi)(y⋆
1,i + y⋆
2,i))







2(γj − γi)x0 if 2(λj − λi) − (γj − γi) ≥ 0
4(λj − λi)x0 otherwise,
> 0.
Finally, consider the case ǫ′
1Γ(y⋆
1 + y⋆






















and we therefore need to show that ǫ′
1Λ(y⋆
1 +y⋆
2) ≤ 0. We claim this is always true under the given
conditions. Note that ǫ′
1Γ(y⋆
1 + y⋆
























30where in the ﬁrst inequality, we use 0 ≥ y⋆
1,i ≥ y⋆
1,j and λj > λi, in the second inequality we use
y⋆
2,i ≤ (γj/γi)y⋆
2,j and in the third inequality we use λi/γi > λj/γj.
Therefore, in each circumstance we have constructed a feasible direction for which l1 and l2
are no larger, e2 is no smaller, and e1 is strictly larger. Since π < 1, this means we have found a
direction that still satisﬁes all the problem constraints (no-short sales and margin constraints) with
strictly larger objective, contradicting the optimality of (y⋆
1,y⋆
2).
Situation 2: Assume that at the optimal solution, the no-short sales constraints are binding for





2,j must hold, meaning it can never be the case that the constraints are binding
in the reverse direction). Note that the no-short sales constraint is binding for asset i, so the above
argument no longer applies (as we cannot sell any more of asset i).
For the next two cases, the following will be of use.
Lemma 2. Let rz1,z2 : R2
+ → R be the family of functions
rz1,z2(λ,γ) ,
ρ(1 − π + z1)γ − 2(πρ + (1 + ρ)z2)λ − z1
p0
x0
(ρ(π − 1) + z1(1 − ρ))γ + 2(ρ(1 + π) + (z1 + 2z2)(1 + ρ))λ
,
parameterized by (z1,z2) ∈ R2
+, and where π ∈ [0,1), ρ ≥ 0, and the denominator is strictly
positive. If λi < λj, γi < γj, and γi/λi < γj/λj, then for any 0 ≤ z1 < ∞, 0 ≤ z2 < ∞,
rz1,z2(λi,γi) < rz1,z2(λj,γj).
Proof. We will ﬁx a λ and a γ as well as all parameters in the function. The claim holds if and
only if ǫ′∇rz1,z2(λ,γ) > 0 for all vectors ǫ = [ǫλ ǫγ]′ ∈ R2
+ with ǫλ ≤ (λ/γ)ǫγ (i.e., moving in any
directions such that λ and γ do not decrease, nor does their ratio γ/λ, must increase rz1,z2(λ,γ)).



















A , ρ(1 + π) + (z1 + 2z2)(1 + ρ)
B , ρπ + (1 + ρ)z2
C , ρ(1 − π + z1)
D , ρ(1 − π) + z1(1 − ρ).
31To verify that the gradient condition holds over all such ǫ, we need only check the extreme rays of
the set, which are given by ǫ1 = [0 1]′ and ǫ2 = [(λ/γ) 1]′. This is clearly true for ǫ1, as A > 0,























(BD − AC)γ + (AC − BD)λ + (Aλ + Bγ)
z1p0
x0




where we are using A ≥ 0, B ≥ 0.
Now note that in this case, y⋆
1,i = rz1,z2(λi,γi), with (z1,z2) the optimal Lagrange multipliers,
because at the optimal solution the no-short sales constraint is active for asset i (rz1,z2(λi,γi) is the
form of the optimal solution, as discussed earlier, for asset i in this case). We will argue that for
asset j, which satisﬁes y⋆
1,j +y⋆
2,j > −x0 by assumption, we have y⋆
1,j > rz1,z2(λj,γj). Since Lemma
2 implies that rz1,z2(λj,γj) > rz1,z2(λi,γi) = y⋆
1,i, this will establish the result.
We can interpret rz1,z2(λj,γj) as the optimal ﬁrst-period trade for asset j (with the Lagrange
multipliers ﬁxed at (z1,z2)) if we are forcing asset j to satisfy the no-short sales constraint tightly






















subject to −x ≤ y ≤ 0,
where fj > gj ≥ hj. Assuming the inequalities are inactive at the optimal solution (it is easy to
verify that y = 0 cannot be optimal, and if −x0 is optimal, then y = rz1,z2(λj,γj) = −x0 < y⋆
1,j, so
we are done), the optimal solution y must satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition:
(fj − hj)(y − y⋆
1,j) − (gj − hj)(−x − y⋆
2,j − y) = 0
 
(fj + gj − 2hj)y = (fj − hj)y⋆




2,j > −x0 by assumption in this case, we have
(fj + gj − 2hj)y < (fj + gj − 2hj)y⋆
1,j,
32and since fj > gj ≥ hj, this implies the optimal y must satisfy y < y⋆
1,j, which gives us the result.
Situation 3: Assume that at the optimal solution, the no-short sales constraints are binding for
both assets i and j. In this case, we have y⋆
1,i = rz1,z2(λi,γi) and y⋆
1,j = rz1,z2(λj,γj). The result
now follows by Lemma 2.
Proof of Result 7.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we will use the notation (δ) to denote that a parameter in question
(e.g., optimal solution, shadow price, etc.) is a function of the second-period shock size, δ ≥ 0,
which will be varying. We will show that under the given conditions we can ﬁnd a ˆ δ with z1(ˆ δ) = 0,
the no-short sales constraints active for both asset i and asset j and z2(ˆ δ) ﬁnite but arbitrarily
large. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let rz1,z2 : R2
+ → R be the family of functions as described in Lemma 2. Then if
γi/λi < γj/λj, then there exists a 0 ≤ z2 < ∞ such that r0,z2(λi,γi) < r0,z2(λj,γj).






































ai = ρ(1 − π − 2πσi)
bi = 2(1 + ρ)σi
ci = ρ(π − 1 + 2(1 + π)σi),
and analogously for (aj,bj,cj). Since the denominators are both positive, one can verify that there
exists a z2 ≥ 0 such that r0,z2(λi,γi) < r0,z2(λj,γj) if
2(aibj − ajbi) − (bicj − bjci) < 0
33holds. Some simple algebra shows that
2(aibj − ajbi) − (bicj − bjci) = 2ρ(1 + ρ)(1 − π)(σj − σi),
and since ρ > 0, π ∈ [0,1), σj < σi implies the result.
Now consider the problem of ﬁnding the maximum possible ¯ δ > 0 such that the two-period
problem is still feasible. Following the proof of Result 5, we ﬁnd that such a ¯ δ corresponds to the
trade y1 = −x0/2, y2 = −x0/2, i.e., splitting up all assets equally across the two periods. Since the
objective function for computing this ¯ δ is strictly convex, the solution y1 = −x0/2 and y2 = −x0/2
can be the only solution that satisﬁes the second-period margin constraint at ¯ δ, and it must be
that ¯ δ > 0 (since the trade y1 = −x0/2, y2 = 0 satisﬁes the constraints for the problem δ = 0
and the objective function for computing ¯ δ is strictly convex). So, the feasible set to the original
problem with δ = ¯ δ is a singleton at which the no-short sales constraints are obviously tight. By
assumption, the ﬁrst-period margin constraint is strictly satisﬁed, and hence z1(¯ δ) = 0. Moreover,
for any δ > ¯ δ, the problem is infeasible, and therefore we must have z2(¯ δ) = +∞.
To complete the proof, we need to argue that we can ﬁnd a small enough perturbation, ǫ > 0,
such that at ¯ δ−ǫ, it is still optimal to have both box constraints active, z1(¯ δ−ǫ) = 0, and z2(¯ δ−ǫ)
is ﬁnite but arbitrarily large. If we can do this, we will have found a δ for which the ﬁrst-period
margin constraint is inactive, assets i and j are both tight on the no-short sales constraint, and
z2(δ) can be made as large as desired; since y⋆
1,i(δ) = r0,z2(δ)(λi,γi) and y⋆
1,j(δ) = r0,z2(δ)(λj,γj),
the result will then follow by Lemma 3.
First, notice that the feasible set at δ = ¯ δ is a singleton, as argued above. For any ǫ > 0, we
are enlarging a single ellipsoid, and the feasible set must therefore still be compact (closed and
bounded). The singleton at ¯ δ is strictly contained inside the ﬁrst-period margin ellipsoid. Since the
feasible set shrinks to a singleton strictly contained in the ﬁrst-period margin ellipsoid as ǫ → 0,
we can ﬁnd a suﬃciently small ǫ1 > 0 such that the feasible set is still strictly contained inside the
ﬁrst-period margin constraint for all ǫ ∈ [0,ǫ1].
Now consider how z2 varies with δ. z2 is an optimal Lagrange multiplier; it is obtained by
minimizing a rational function and therefore z2(δ) is continuous, and z2(¯ δ) = ∞. Since it is a
continuous function, we can ﬁnd an ǫ2 > 0 such that z2(¯ δ −ǫ2) is ﬁnite but arbitrarily large. Since
it can be arbitrarily large, we can make it large enough such that the no-short sales constraints for
both assets i and j must still be active for any ǫ ∈ [0,ǫ2].
Now take ǫ = min(ǫ1,ǫ2) > 0. We have z1(¯ δ − ǫ) = 0, z2(¯ δ − ǫ) < ∞, and both no-short sales
constraints active at ¯ δ − ǫ. The proof is complete.
34Proof of Result 8.
Proof. (a) follows directly by Result 6. (b) follows by applying Result 7 to construct such a δ for
each pair of assets in {1,...,m}, then taking the maximum over all such δ.
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